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Sixty-four middle-class preschool children chose between waiting for  a pre- 
ferred item and receiving a less desired item immediately. The items were o f  
different classes, i.e., one food and one toy, and subjects waited with one, 
both, or neither o f  the rewards available for  viewing. The likelihood that a 
subject would continue waiting for the delayed reward was found to in- 
crease as a function o f  previous waiting time rather than decrease or remain 
constant as required by two current theories o f  delay o f  gratification 
processes, an aversive affect model implied by Mischel and Ebbesen (1970) 
and Atkinson and Birch "s (1970) "'dynamics o f  action. "' Although display 
of  rewards impaired successful delay, replicating previous results, dynamics 
of  action predictions o f  differential effects for  display o f  immediately 
available and delayed outcomes o f  different classes were not confirmed. 
Systematic observation o f  spontaneous subject activities during the delay 
period offered additional support for  the notion that distraction facilitates 
successful waiting behavior. A decision-attention model is proposed to 
account for  the present results as well as those o f  previous studies o f  delay 
o f  gratification. 
In any delay of  gratification situation, a person must choose between 
waiting for a delayed attractive outcome and taking a less desirable outcome 
that is available immediately. It has been suggested by Mischel (1974b) and 
others that there are actually two components to this decision process. First, 
the person must choose whether or not to begin waiting for the preferred 
'We would like to thank the director, Mr. Jack Lewis, and the staff of the Red Bell Nursery of 
Plymouth, Michigan, for helping us obtain subjects for this study and providing access to 
their facilities. We are also grateful to Ms. Shirley St. Peter and Ms. Carolyn Jagacinski for 
their work as experimenters. 
~Address all correspondence to J. Frank Yates, 136 Perry Building, Department of Psychol- 
ogy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104. 
103 
0146-7239179/0600-0103503.00/0  © 1979 Plenum Publishing Corporat ion 
104 Yates and Revelle 
alternative. If he/she chooses to do so, he/she must then sustain that choice 
throughout the required waiting period. This study was designed to examine 
what happens during the second phase in the delay of gratification 
process--the psychological mechanisms operative during the period of time 
after the decision to wait has been made but before the preferred reward 
becomes available. 
Based on the results of a series of studies (Mischel & Baker, 1975; 
Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972; Mischel & 
Moore, 1973; Mischel & Underwood, 1974), Mischel and his colleagues 
have proposed the currently dominant theory of processes operative during 
delay. Mischel's model is based on the premise that waiting for a desired 
outcome induces unpleasant frustration affect. Specifically, this aversive 
affect results from (1) the person's inability to obtain the preferred outcome 
immediately, (2) the conflict implicit in the choice situation, and (3) the 
mere activity of waiting. In addition to postulating the existence of frustra- 
tion affect, Mischel asserts further that the strength of such affect is the 
governing factor in delay behavior. If the affect becomes too intense during 
the waiting period, the person will terminate his/her wait by taking the less 
attractive, immediately available item simply to escape from the situation 
and end the unpleasant feelings. Thus any activity during the waiting period 
that increases frustration affect should tend to decrease waiting times, 
whereas activities that decrease the aversive affect should facilitate waiting. 
To test this hypothesis, the Mischel group has manipulated the subject's 
attention to and thoughts about the outcomes in delay situations. The pre- 
diction that increased exposure to and thought about the outcomes should 
lead to decreased waiting times has been confirmed experimentally (Mischel 
& Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel et al., 1972). 
The role of aversive affect in the entire process, however, has simply 
been inferred rather than investigated directly. Since reminders of the delay 
situation have led to decreased delay times, it has been assumed that the 
intervening variable is increased frustration affect. The affect itself and its 
effects on behavior have been accepted without direct evidence. There have 
been some recent investigations concerning the relationship of affect to 
delay of gratification (Moore, Clyburn, & Underwood, 1976; Schwarz & 
Pollack, 1977); however, these studies have focused on the effect of the sub- 
ject's affective state on his/her initial choice in a delay paradigm, not on the 
processes sustaining a delay once it has begun. The results of Mischel's most 
direct test of the effects of aversive affect, in fact, contradict the predictions 
of the model (Mischel et al., 1972). Children who were instructed to "think 
sad thoughts" during the delay period, presumably creating additional 
negative affect, did not terminate their waiting any sooner than children 
instructed to think about the rewards or children who were given no instruc- 
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tion concerning their thoughts during the delay period. In each of these 
conditions subjects waited with both rewards present, so the base level of 
frustration affect should have been equivalent across the groups. The addi- 
tional negative affect induced in the "think sad" group, then, did not in- 
crease the tendencies of the subjects in that group to terminate the delay 
period, as would be expected if aversive affect were the governing factor in 
delay behavior. Since the very existence of unpleasant affect during the 
waiting period and its instrumental role in delay processes form the founda- 
tion of Mischel's theory, these factors require a more direct substantiation 
than has previously been offered. 
One implication of the central role of affect can be tested directly. 
According to the model, the activity of waiting, especially when combined 
with thoughts about the outcomes, induces aversive affect. So, as long as 
the person continues to wait, aversive affect should continue to exist also. If 
one interprets the model to say that aversive affect is a direct function of the 
a m o u n t  of waiting or thought about the outcomes, then it follows that the 
longer the person waits, the higher his/her aversive affect level shoutd 
become. A less stringent interpretation suggests that aversive affect remains 
constant as long as the person waits and/or thinks about the outcomes. At 
any rate, the model leads to clear-cut predictions about one observable 
aspect of waiting behavior: The likelihood that the person will continue to 
wait should be either constant or a decreasing function of the amount of 
time he/she has already waited. 
As an alternative to Mischel's explanation of delay processes, Birch 
and Atkinson (1974) have applied their general theory of motivation, "the 
dynamics of action" (Atkinson & Birch, 1970), to behavior in delay situa- 
tions. Although the justification is different, Birch and Atkinson's theory 
leads to predictions about continued waiting that are similar to those of 
Mischel's theory. Within the dynamics of action framework, the behavior 
that occurs at any given time depends on the relative strengths of "tenden- 
cies" to engage in each of the possible behaviors available to the person; 
Joe., whichever tendency is strongest at a particular time will determine the 
person's behavior at that moment. The theory also asserts that the tendency 
for a given behavior decreases in a negatively accelerated fashion toward an 
asymptote during the time in which the person actually engages in that be- 
havior. In addition, the strength of the tendency for a particular behavior 
increases as a linear function of the amount of time the person is exposed to 
an "instigating force" for the behavior. If the person neither engages in the 
behavior nor is exposed to an appropriate instigating force, the tendency for 
that behavior remains constant. 
Two of the behaviors available to the person during the waiting period 
in a delay of gratification situation are continued waiting and terminating 
106 Yates and Revelle 
the delay period by accepting the less attractive outcome. According to the 
dynamics of action, as long as the person engages in waiting behavior, the 
tendency to wait will be continually decreasing. Eventually, the waiting 
tendency should be dominated by the tendency to terminate the delay 
situation. If the person is exposed to favorable consequences of terminating 
the delay, e.g., the immediately available outcome, the tendency for ter- 
mination should overtake the tendency for waiting even sooner. Regardless, 
however, the probability that a person continues to wait in a delay situation 
should be a decreasing function of the amount of time he/she has already 
waited. Thus the first aim of the present study was to test these predictions 
of Mischel's and Birch and Atkinson's models by examining the pattern of 
waiting behavior terminations over a complete delay period. 
Although the aversive affect and the dynamics of action models have 
similar implications concerning the effects of previous waiting time on con- 
tinued waiting behavior, under certain conditions their predictions diverge 
regarding the effects of exposing the subject to his/her potential rewards 
during the waiting period. Mischel and Ebbeson's (1970) study illustrates 
the effects generally found. Subjects waited most successfully when neither 
the delayed nor the immediately available outcome was visible. There was 
no difference in the amount of time subjects delayed when exposed to either 
of the rewards alone. Subjects who could see both outcomes waited 
marginally significantly less time than did subjects who saw displays of only 
one of the rewards. These results are congruent with the prescriptions of  
Mischel's model, which proposes that the display of either outcome should 
lead to frustration affect and therefore shortened waiting times. The model 
also specifies that the intensity of affect should be greatest, and thus waiting 
times shortest, when both the delayed and immediately available outcomes 
are displayed. 
Birch and Atkinson (1974) demonstrate how the dynamics of action 
can account for the display effects found in the various studies of the 
Mischel group to date. Their analysis also suggests certain effects the 
aversive affect model does not predict. They indicate that the consequences 
of exposure to the delayed and immediately available outcomes generally 
should be quite different. In particular, displaying the immediately avail- 
able outcome should inhibit effective delay behavior much more than dis- 
playing the delayed outcome. It is claimed that this result has not been 
found in Mischel's previous studies because the delayed and immediately 
available outcomes in those studies have always been members of the same 
class (e.g., both foods). 
Birch and Atkinson's argument is as follows. First, they specialize the 
term waiting to apply only when the subject is actually thinking about and 
anticipating the delayed outcome during the waiting period. A display of 
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the delayed outcome is likely to lead to a great deal of conscious waiting 
during the delay period, thus causing the tendency for (further) waiting to 
decline toward its asymptote. On the other hand, displaying the immedi- 
ately available outcome amounts to providing an instigating force for term- 
inating the delay period. Since tendencies for behaviors generally increase in 
response to instigating forces more rapidly than they decrease toward their 
asymptotes when the behaviors are actually taking place, exposure of the 
immediately available outcome should lead to shorter delay times than ex- 
posure of  the delayed outcome. Now, if both outcomes happen to be in the 
same class, "displacement" should occur such that a display of the delayed 
outcome not only leads to conscious waiting but, more importantly, induces 
an instigating force for terminating the delay period. The role of displace- 
ment can be illustrated as follows. Suppose a child is offered a choice 
between a pretzel now and a marshmallow, which he/she prefers, later. If 
the child becomes hungry while waiting for and thinking about the marsh- 
mallow, he/she can satisfy his/her hunger at least partially by taking the 
immediately available pretzel. This logic applies even more directly to cases 
in which the delayed reward is simply a larger quantity of the immediately 
available outcome, e.g., two pretzels versus one pretzel. So, in this case, 
displaying any of  the rewards increases the subject's tendency to take the 
immediately available one. This uniform display effect should not be 
expected when the outcomes are qualitatively different from each other. 
So, a second aim of the present research was to compare the viability 
of Mischel's and Birch and Atkinson's claims by exposing subjects in delay 
of gratification situations to outcomes from two distinct classes. Both 
models imply that delay behavior should be most successful when the sub- 
ject is exposed to neither outcome. While the aversive affect model predicts 
no difference in the delay behavior of subjects exposed to either the delayed 
or the immediately available outcome alone, the dynamics of action model 
implies that display of the delayed outcome should impair effective: waiting 
less. Both models predict that waiting behavior should be least successful, 
markedly so according to the aversive affect model, when the subject is ex- 
posed to both outcomes. 
Since the focus of this study was on processes occurring during the 
waiting period in delay situations, we also observed the behaviors of sub- 
jects during that period. Casual observations of subjects' waiting period 
activities have been reported by MischeI (1974a, for example). The present 
study simply included a more detailed and systematic procedure for ob- 
serving and recording subjects' spontaneous activities while waiting. These 
observations provide an additional source of evidence regarding the status 
of current theories, an opportunity to determine the types of  behavior that 
are associated with successful delay, and the possibility of suggesting new 
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waiting strategies that have not been included in contemporary theories of 
delay behavior. 
M E T H O D  
Subjects 
Subjects in this study were middle-class children from two private 
preschools. There are two reasons why preschool children were chosen to be 
the subjects in this study. First, small units of time are more salient to young 
children than to adults, so it is more feasible to offer a meaningful delay 
choice to this group within an experimental paradigm. Second, we were 
interested in testing predictions arising from Mischel's model and making 
comparisons with the results of his studies in which he has used preschool 
subjects. There were 64 subjects in this study. An additional 6 subjects were 
dropped due to refusal to come for the second session or failure to under- 
stand the instructions. Ages ranged from 38.5 to 69 months, with a mean 
age of 53.5 months. There were equal numbers of males and females in each 
of the four conditions, and mean age was equated across conditions. The 
two experimenters were both female; one conducted the preliminary session 
for each child and the other conducted the experimental session. The experi- 
menter who conducted the experimental session was naive with respect to 
the issues and hypotheses of the study. 
Preliminary Session 
In order to select the items to be offered to a given child in the delay 
situation, a preliminary session was conducted to determine his/her pre- 
ferences among the available items. Each subject was told that he/she 
would be shown a variety of things in order to determine which ones he/she 
liked best. First, all of  the items (a finger puppet, a whistle, a party favor 
blow-out, a small box of raisins, several marshmallows, and several animal 
crackers) were presented. Each item was named, and the toys were demon- 
strated; then all 15 of the possible pairings of the six items were presented in 
a standard, random order, with left/right position randomized also. For 
each pair of items, the subject was asked to point to the item he/she "liked 
best." After completing the 15 choices, the subject was told that there 
would be another session the following day. 
Based on the individual child's preferences, one food item and one toy 
were chosen to be offered to that child in the experimental session. Using X 
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to represent the preferred item for which the child had to wait and Y to 
represent the tess preferred item which the child was allowed to have im- 
mediately, the items to be used were determined according to the following 
criteria: (1) Item X and Item Y were of different classes (one food and one 
toy). (2) Item X was preferred to Item Y in the direct pairing of these two 
items. (3) In at least one paired comparison, one other item (of either class) 
was preferred to Item X; similarly, Item Y was preferred to some other item 
(of either class) in at least one paired comparison. (4) The difference 
between the numbers of items to which Items X and Y were preferred was 
maximal, given the other criteria. Restrictions 3 and 4 were included to 
ensure a moderate, yet substantial, discrepancy in the subject's preference 
of Item X over Item Y. The preferred item was food for half of the subjects 
in each condition and a toy for the other half. 
Experimental Session 
In order to equate the subject's hunger level in the preliminary and ex- 
perimental sessions as closely as possible, each subject's sessions were 
scheduled at the same time of day on 2 consecutive days. For the delay 
session, subjects were taken to a small room in an experimental trailer. In 
the room there were a table and one chair, a fan blocked from view by a 
partition, one window covered with blinds, and two one-way mirrors. The 
child was seated at the table, facing a wall. After talking to the child for 
several moments to help him/her become comfortable in the room, the 
experimenter initiated a game with the child to teach him/her a knocking 
procedure for signaling the experimenter to return from an adjacent room. 
She told the child: " I 'm  going to go into the next room and close the door. 
After I have left, I want you to knock on the table two times like this [dem- 
onstrates]. When you knock on the table two times I will come right back! 
Okay?" This procedure was repeated several times, until the child 
understood that he/she could "bring the experimenter back" by knocking° 
The experimenter then presented the child's preferred and less pre- 
ferred items and asked the subject which one he/she wanted, to confirm 
his/her preference from the previous day, If the child switched his/her 
preference, which rarely happened, the remainder of  the session was con- 
ducted on the basis of the newly declared preference. From this point on, 
the procedure described by Mischel and Ebbesen (1970) was followed. The 
experimenter told the child that she was going to leave the room, and that if 
the child waited for her to come back he/she could have his/her preferred 
reward. The child was told that if he/she did not wish to wait, he/she could 
use the knocking procedure and the experimenter would come back, but the 
child would then receive his/her tess preferred reward. 
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Each subject waited in one of four display conditions: (1) both items 
present in front of the subject during the waiting period, (2) preferred item 
present, (3) less preferred item present, or (4) neither item present. The 
experimenter placed the item(s) to be displayed on the table in front of the 
child and placed the other(s) in a cake tin, to be left beneath the table. She 
then repeated the contingencies and left the room. If the subject did not 
signal for the experimenter to return, she waited in the adjacent room for 20 
minutes. During the waiting period, the experimenter recorded the 
subject's behaviors within each 60-second interval. After the subject 
signaled or 20 minutes had passed, the experimenter returned to the room 
and gave the child the appropriate reward. Each subject was then given a 
few minutes in which to eat or play with his/her reward before being taken 
back to the classroom. 
RESULTS 
The processes governing the initial decision between the delayed and 
immediately available outcomes may be qualitatively different from those 
responsible for the maintenance of waiting once it has been chosen. Since 
this study focuses on delay-sustaining processes, the analyses reported here 
include only the data of subjects who exhibited at least minimal waiting be- 
havior, i.e., did not take the less preferred item immediately. There were 7 
subjects, distributed across the conditions, who chose to terminate the 
session immediately; thus, analyses were performed on the data of the re- 
maining 57. 
Continued Waiting Probability Function 
The probability that a subject continues waiting (W), given previous 
waiting time (t), may be represented by P(W[ t). Strictly speaking, "con- 
tinued waiting" is an instantaneous phenomenon. Practically, however, an 
observer can judge that a person has continued to wait at a certain instant in 
time only if the person is still waiting at some point beyond that instant. Our 
procedure for estimating the P(WIt) function involved partitioning the 
20-minute waiting period into 1-minute intervals. A subject was considered 
to have "continued waiting" at a particular moment if at the end of the next 
l-minute interval he/she was still waiting. Thus, given a number of subjects 
who have waited 5 minutes, for example, some may continue waiting 
through the 6th minute while others may terminate the waiting period 
before the end of the 6th minute. The former group is judged to have con- 
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tinued waiting, given 5 minutes of previous waiting time. In this way, it was 
determined for every 1-minute point what proportion of the remaining sub- 
jects continued to wait, and analyses were carried out to determine whether 
and how the proportion of subjects continuing to wait depended on pre- 
vious waiting time. 
Figure 1 displays the successive values of these proportions. There is 
no indication that probabilities of continued waiting decline as a function of 
previous waiting time, as the dynamics of action and the strong form of the 
aversive affect model imply they should. There is also no evidence for the 
assertion of the weak form of the aversive affect model that probabilities of 
continued waiting should be constant. Indeed, there is a clear tendency for 
continued waiting probabilities to increase with time. These observations 
are corroborated by the results of regression analyses. The best-fitting linear 
regression function has a positive slope of .006 (F(1,18) = 6.91, p < .05). 
The increasing curvilinear function shown in the figure, P(W t ti) . 67t i 
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+ .368, fits even better. The correlation between actual and predicted 
values of  P(Wlt i) for that function is .64 (t(18) = 3.54, p <  .005). 
Outcome Display Effects 
Since the distribution of waiting times tended toward bimodality, 
results were evaluated through the use of contingency table analyses. There 
were no differences in waiting behavior between subjects whose preferred 
outcome was food and those who preferred toys. The analyses were 
therefore performed ignoring preferred item class distinctions. 
Table I contains the frequencies of subjects in each display condition 
who either waited for the delayed outcome for the full 20-minute period or 
terminated their waiting early. Subjects exposed to no outcome display were 
relatively less inclined to terminate waiting early than were subjects exposed 
to at least one of the outcomes (p < .05, Fisher exact probability test). Thus 
the data are consistent with previous indications that outcome displays 
induce processes that inhibit waiting behavior. The analysis provides no 
indication that any outcome display condition interferes with successful 
waiting behavior more than the other display conditions. Thus the results 
do not provide support for the dynamics of action claim that when the items 
are from different classes, displays of immediately available and delayed 
outcomes should affect waiting behavior differently. There is also no 
evidence for the prediction of  the aversive affect model that successful delay 
behavior should be substantially less likely to occur when both outcomes are 
exposed than when only one item is displayed. 
Waiting Period Activities 
Observations of subject behaviors during the waiting period were re- 
corded in l-minute time intervals. Thus only the observations for the 42 
Table I. Frequencies of Categories of 
Waiting Behavior by Display Condi- 
tion 
Waiting 
DispNyed outcome PartiN FuH 
Immediate 12 3 
Delayed 12 2 
Both 12 3 
Neither 7 6 
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subjects who waited at least 1 minute were analyzed. Each activity was 
coded dichotomously for its occurrence or nonoccurrence during a given 
subject's waiting period. The resulting 2 X 2 contingency tables for each 
activity (Partial-Full Wait X Activity Occurrence-Nonoccurrence) were ex- 
amined for association via Fisher exact probability tests. Subjects who 
waited the full delay period were much more likely to (a) talk to themselves 
about things not related to the delay situation (p < .05), (b) yawn (p < .001), 
(c) rest their heads on their arms (p<  .05), (d) look around at the floor of 
the room (p<  .005), and (e) fidget in their chairs ( p<  .05). On the other 
hand, subjects who did not wait through the entire delay period were much 
more prone to (a) silently tap the table in rehearsal of the signal for ter- 
minating the delay period ( p <  .001) and (b) stare at the prizes (p<  .05). 
Other behavioral categories in which there were no differences between sub- 
jects who terminated early and those who waited were (a) talking to them- 
selves about things related to the delay situation, (b) touching the prizes, 
and (c) creating irrelevant games to play while waiting. 
DISCUSSION 
The results provide no support for Atkinson and Birch's dynamics of  
action theory as an explanation for delay of gratification behavior. 
Although the current study does provide additional evidence consistent with 
Mischel's suggestion that distraction from the particulars of the delay situa- 
tion facilitates waiting, the results are incompatible with the major thesis of  
Mischel's aversive affect model--that induced frustration affect is the 
governing factor in delay behavior. In light of the lack of support for these 
two leading theories of delay behavior, the major task of providing a 
coherent and parsimonious accounting for that behavior remains. 
An extension of basic principles of  decision theory seems capable of  
explaining delay behavior rather well. Most theories about decisions 
involving outcomes receivable at different times (cf. Fishburn, 1970, Chap. 
7; Jamison, 1970) suggest that the crucial issue is the trade-off between a 
value differential and a time differential. In a delay of gratification situa- 
tion, the immediately available outcome is valued less than the delayed out- 
come. The difference in subjective value is the value differential. On the 
other hand, the amount of  time that must elapse before the delayed out- 
come is receivable is obviously greater than the time before the immediately 
available outcome can be received. The person's perception of that dif- 
ference in time is the time differential. In order for the person to choose to 
wait for the delayed outcome, he/she must (implicitly) judge the magnitude 
of the value differential to more than offset the magnitude of the time dif- 
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ferential. Otherwise, it is not "worth it" for the subject to wait. Clearly, 
this logic implies that if a person is inclined to wait when the time differen- 
tial is 20 minutes, he/she should be even more willing to wait when the time 
differential is 15 minutes. Thus one would expect precisely the kind of 
pattern of results observed in the present study; probabilities of continued 
waiting should increase as a function of the amount of time the person has 
already waited since the time differential becomes progressively shorter the 
longer the person waits. 
What about distraction? At any time during a delay period, the 
person can do one o f  several things. First, he/she could recognize that 
he/she has an opportunity to make a decision about waiting. He/she can 
then either decide to continue waiting or decide to terminate the delay 
period. The person might not recognize that a decision opportunity exists at 
all if he/she happens to be thinking about things other than the delay 
situation° The net effect of such distraction is continued waiting, but by de- 
fault rather than by deliberate decision. When a delay period begins, the 
opportunity for making a decision should be very salient to the person. And 
given the relatively large time differential during the early stages of the 
delay period, delay terminations should be very common. Once the delay 
period has begun in earnest, there should be a greater chance that the person 
will become distracted, especially if there are few reminders of the delay 
situation physically present. The results reported here are certainly com- 
patible with this viewpoint. 
The data of the present investigation, as well as those of previous 
studies of delay of gratification, can be explained very readily by the pro- 
posed "decision-attention model." A couple of recent studies illustrate the 
ability of the model to integrate a variety of results in the area. Corfield, 
Al.Issa, and Johnson (1976) asked each of their subjects to work a cross- 
word puzzle while waiting for a delayed reward. For half the subjects the 
words making up the puzzle were relevant to the awaited reward, whereas 
for the other half they were irrelevant. For groups whose reward was not 
contingent on the work they did, as is generally the case in delay paradigms, 
subjects waited significantly longer when puzzle words were irrelevant to 
the outcomes in the delay situation. As suggested by the decision-attention 
model, subjects exposed to the delay-irrelevant words may well have not 
recognized that a delay decision opportunity existed. Miller and Karniol 
(1977) found that when subjects devalued the preferred reward in a delay 
situation, they generally had shorter delay times as well. This outcome is 
accommodated within the decision-attention model in that devaluation of  
the preferred reward amounts to a reduction of the value differential. Miller 
and Karniol's study also suggests that one of the things that may explain 
various delay phenomena is reassessment of value differentials as well as 
time differentials during the delay period. 
It is possible that delay behavior is determined by the components of 
the decision-attention model and constructs such as aversive affect. At the 
present time, however, there are no results reported in the literature that 
seem to demand the role of such auxiliary constructs. Nevertheless, future 
research should not onlly be directed toward systematic and thorough testing 
of the decision-attention model as here stated but should also examine elab- 
orations of the model that might incorporate concepts like aversive affect. 
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